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This paper reviews two formulations of some structural
aspects of knowledge systems. These two structural specifica-
tions of knowledge systems, by Judith Willer and by Norwood
Russell Hanson, are then combined to suggest a model for
relating several "ideal type" knowledge systems. Some
tentative descriptions of these knowledge systems are given.
The paper concludes by suggesting that scientific systems
involve a particular combination of two of the systems and
that sociology of knowledge and cognitive psychology have
clear roles in the theoretical development of such a model.
We make 'sense' out of the phenomenal world in a number of ways. These ways
of ordering, structuring, and relating the world are here referred to as under-
standings. What is taken as truth, correctness, or valid and worthwhile knowledge
varies across different forms of understandings.
A sing~e individual can simultaneously hold different understandings of the
same subject matter. A physical scientist may have an abstract, theoretical
understanding of the physical universe and at the same time operate within the
physical world using a practical empirical form of understanding. What is a
valid explanation of what "makes" his car go is different within each form of
understanding. The theoretical form consists of various laws of mechanics, gases,
and electrical activity. The event "car moving" disappears within the scope and
generality of the explanation. The individual possessing this form of understand-
ing could hardly use it to convey to another person the "reason" his car did not
start on a particular occasion. Such a reason could however, be conveyed through
the use of a shared practical form of empirical understanding. He might simply
say that the battery cable was broken, and thus convey the "reason."
Understandings take objective form in knowledge systems. Knowledge systems
have been characterized in many ways. Some examples of the tags which have been
used are: deductive, inductive, religious, scientific, mystical, practical-empirical,
analytic, experimental, naturalistic, abstract, and theoretical. Judith Willer
(1971) suggests that the structure of all such knowledge systems can be character-
ized in terms of three basic types of thought connection.
The term "thought connection" refers to the structural character or form of
relation the understanding makes among the ideas with which it deals. The three
types of connections are empirical, rational, and abstractive. They are illus-
trated in Table 1.
Empirical thought connections are those that operate only at the empirical
level; rational thought connections operate only at the theoretical level; and
abstractive thought makes connections between the theoretic and observational
levels.
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Table 1. Basic Types of Thought Connection (Willer, 1971:20).
t; Connective Level Types of thought connection
Theoretic I Rational b or a
i a ~ b '~ \, Abstractive
I I J;Observational Empirical A BI
I A )Bl I
These three types of thought connections are further combined to produce
four types of knowledge systems. The four are magical, mystical, religious, and
scientific. They are illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2. Combinations of Types of Thought Connection in Four Types of Knowledge
Systems (Willer, 1971:25).
Magical
Knowledge System:
Mystical Religious Scientific
Connective Levels:
a---.~b
1
B
b
l
A~BA-~B
Theoretic
Observational
..-...-----1
I
I
All of the knowledge systems utilize empirical thinking in some manner or
another. Magical systems exist fl ••• only if [empirical] • thinking alone
forms the basis for gaining knowledge about connections in the world" (Willer,
1971:26).
A mystical knowledge system adds to empirical thought a conception of an
ideal rather than empirical end. This conception of an ideal end and its
connection with empirical events forms an abstractive link, and when this sort of
structure emerges a mystical knowledge system is formed.
When rational connections are made at the theoretic level and are in turn
used to place ethical interpretations on the empirical world, a religious know-
ledge system exists. The connections among concepts are tight and necessary and
do not give way to empirical "evidence," rather they afford a "way" to interpret
and understand empirical events.
A scientific knowledge system involves all three types of thought connections:
empirical, rational, and abstractive. Scientific systems both interpret empirical
events through rational connections at the theoretical level and allow for those
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connections to be corrected if they are not isomorphic to empirical events.
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Hanson (1971) in a short essay on philosophy of science, set himself the
task of outlining "a balanced 'middle of the channel' resolution ... " to the
" . conceptual terrain of standard issues . . ." (1971 :1-2) wlrLch makes up
philosophy of science. I would like to suggest that he does more than this however.
Implicit in his discussion is a model of knowledge systems which, if combined with
Judith Willer's model, forms a still more general model from which a theory of
knowledge might be built.
Hanson viewed the understanding of events as placing them in a framework of
other If •• e. 'unsurprisabilia' known to obtain" (1971:32) or placing anomalies
It ••• within an intelligible framework of ideas .•. " (1971:48). Magical,
mystical, religious, and scientific knowledge systems all provide an intelligible
framework of "unsurprisabilia" (i.e., standard, consensual knowledge) within which
encountered events can be placed and interpreted.
Hanson further suggests that statements can be placed in a logical space cir-
cumscribed by syntactic, semantic, and epistemological dimensions.
Syntax is characterized by Hanson as involving the "sign-design" of statements,
that is, the logical character which results from the fl ••• symbol structure of
an assertion" (Hanson, 1971:49-50). The two logical extremes of this dimension
are synthetic statements and analytic statements. A statement "•.. is synthetic
if and only if its negation ••• entails no inconsistencies (i.e., nothing of
the form Q and not-Q)" (Hanson, 1971:50). 'Synthetic' can best be viewed in the
context of this paper as referring to statements the truth of which is logically
open. When the negation of a statement entails an inconsistency, then it is the
"opposite" of synthetic and is called analytic. 'Analytic' refers to statements
the truth of which is "contained" within the form of the statement itself.
According to Hanson (1971:51) "Claims like 'All fathers are parents', 'Bicycles
have two wheels', and 'All equiangular triangles are equilateral' are (re: their
sign-design) the opposite of synthetic." The negation of such statements entails
an inconsistency, and such statements are true by virtue of their linguistic con-
struction.
The semantic dimension has at one pole statements that are invulnerable and
vulnerable statements at the other pole.
Invulnerable claims (whatever the genesis of that invulnerability)
are often designated as 'necessary' or 'necessarily true'. Vulnerable
claims, on the other hand, are said to be 'contingent', e.g., on the
way the world is, or on the rules of the game, or on the conditions
of inquiry within a given context. (Hanson, 1971:50)
The epistemological dimension characterizes the status of statements with
regard to experience. Statements can at one extreme be a priori and at the other
a posteriori. Those which are a priori are subject to analysis through reflection,
they need make no direct reference to experience to justify their claims.
A posteriori claims are justified through direct reference to experience.
A priori and a posteriori do not exhaust the meaning of this dimension. The
dimension does not simply refer to "prior and post" analysis but includes some-
thing like the degree to which statements directly depend on experience for their
justification.
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These three dimensions are shown as polar opposites in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Logical Space for the Status of Statements.
A priori
Vulnerable
Analytic
Epistemological
Semantic
Syntactic
Taking the end points of these dimensions three at a time yields eight
separate combinations. These eight combinations are listed in Table 3 as ideal
types.
Table 3. Ideal Type Knowledge Systems.
Epistemological Semantic Syntactic
I. A priori Vulnerable Analytic
II. A priori Vulnerable Synthetic
III. A priori Invulnerable Analytic
IV. A priori Irrvul.nerabl.e Synthetic
V. A posteriori Vulnerable Analytic
VI. A posteriori Vulnerable Synthetic
VII. A posteriori Invulnerable Analytic
VIII. A posteriori Invulnerable Synthetic
Hanson points out that, on the one hand, empirical statements are a posteriori,
vulnerable (or contingent), and synthetic; while on the other hand, tautologies
are a priori, invulnerable (or necessary), and analytic (Hanson, 1971:52). In
terms of Table 3 empirical statements are Type VI and tautologies are Type III.
Judith Willer's characterization of magical knowledge implies two of the
characteristics which Hanson ascribes to empirical statements. She notes that the
elements of magical thought systems are empirical categories which are connected
by trial and error using "rules of thumb" at the observational level~ Thus one
can say that statement forms of magical knowledge systems are empirical, and that
they are vulnerable and contingent (since they are based on rules of thumb) rather
than necessary. Such statement forms are also a posteriori in the sense that they
are directly dependent on experience for their justification. Thus if one event
fails to result in another event which was, according to rule of thumb, "supposed"
to follow, the rule of thumb will be subject to challenge, that is, its claim to
be valid knowledge is vulnerable. In the face '-, ..~ such a challenge ". . . it may
be thought that the intent was no longer present, the causal connection was
broken, or the first event lost its efficacy - its power to produce the second.
(Willer,1971:26). The statements of magical systems can also be characterized in
terms of the syntactic dimension. Such statements are analytic or logically
closed rather than synthetic and open.
The empirical statements to which Willer refers and the empirical statements
to which Hanson refers differ only with respect to the syntactic dimension.
Hanson characterizes empirical statements as synthetic (open), contingent and
a posteriori; Willer's discussion implies that empirical statements are analytic
lclosed), contingent, and a posteriori. This difference is due to the fact that
Hanson limits his discussion to empirical statements that are part of scientific
"
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knowledge systems while Willer's discussion includes empirical statements of
magical knowledge systems. Such systems utilize only empirical thinking to gain
knowledge of the world. According to her, scientific thought systems combine
rational and empirical thought, the combination being in the form of an integra-
tion of rational (open, synthetic) and empirical thought through abstraction
(1971:31). This sort of connection to a rational system is what Hanson seems to
have in mind when he characterized empirical statements as synthetic (e.g., they
are more than matters of definition). Hanson and Willer's discussions of
empirical statements agree when the empirical statements are part of a scientific
knowledge system. The character of empirical statements is then dependent on the
knowledge system of which they are a part.
The three dimensions of this logical space are independent of one another and
should be viewed as "continuous" and not simply dichotomies. Independence simply
means that the "position" of a statement of anyone dimension does not automatic-
ally determine its "position" on the other two. The nature of such a relationship
can perhaps be seen more readily in Figure 2. The dimensions are arranged in a
manner intended to picture a cube-like "space." The syntactic dimension is drawn
as a horizontal axis, the epistemological dimension as a vertical axis and the
semant Lc dimension as an axis running from the "front" of the cube to the "back."
In Figure 2 one should picture the intersection of the three dimensions as
being "on" the page with the vulnerable or contingent pole of the epistemological
dimension proiecting forward from the page and the invulnerable or necessary
pole receding "into" the page.
The purpose of this graphic representation is to point out that although the
three dimensions are viewed as independent of one another, knowledge systems
characterized in terms of them are not viewed as independent of one another. The
arrangement of the dimensions in Figure 2 constitutes a mechanism for relating
different types of knowledge systems in a theoretical model.
The eight combinations of Table 3 should be seen as theoretical ideal types.
These ideal types in turn can be located at the extreme "corners" of the cube.
The following discussion takes up each ideal type and suggests a specific form of
knowledge system which approaches that type.
Type I: A priori - Vulnerable - Analytic
Mystical knowledge systems approach this extreme. Such systems have as their
"object" a "state" which is independent of the empirical world (i.e., a priori).
The knowledge is vulnerable (not in the face of empirical events but in the face
of the rules' "ability" to reach and maintain the mystical state); and the state-
ments have analytical interpretations. Mystical ideals or states gain their
meaning at the abstract level. There are empirical steps for reaching such a
state but the steps do not give the state its meaning - the meaning is gained at
the abstract level.
Type II: A priori - Vulnerable - Synthetic
Metaphysical systems seem to be an ideal type which is synthetic, a priori,
and vulnerable. I will not elaborate on this point in the present paper since I
have done little actual investigation of such knowledge systems. However, on the
surface, metaphysical systems seem to be concerned with a priori truths which are
not "mere" definition or "simply" tautological statements. The concern seems to
be with the absoluteness and certainty of the knowledge. Although ostensibly
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seeking absoluteness and certainty, metaphysical systems are placed at the
vulnerable extreme of the semantic dimension. This hinges more on the methods
metaphysicians use to investigate the system than on the actual statement form
itself. The dialectic might be used as such a method. The individual statements
of a dialectical set of statements are of a necessary or invulnerable logical
form. Thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis are all of invulnerable form individ-
ually; however, taken as a unit the three statements constitute a contingent or
vulnerable set. The vulnerability is found in the thesis - anti-thesis combina-
tion. The dialectical synthesis in turn forms a new synthetic statement (a new
thesis) from the two original statements. The juxtaposition of two analytical
statements could not lead to a synthesis (e.g., all bicycles have two wheels
versus no bicycles have two wheels), therefore it seems that metaphysical state-
ments which take a dialectical form can be characterized as synthetic. Whether
this is true of all metaphysical methods I will not attempt to say without further
investigation. I do think that all metaphysical systems seek a priori truths
however.
Figure 2. A Logical Space for Knowledge Systems.
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Type III: A priori - Invulnerable - Analytic
Theology as the theoretical aspect of religions illustrates this type of
knowledge system. In its ideal type the statements are invulnerable, a priori,
and analytic in form. The meaning of the statements may be illustrated by
ethical stances in relation to empirical events, but the reason (meaning) for the
stance gained from the symbolic structure and not from the empirical event.
Empirical events are relevant to the meaning of the statements as illustrations
of good and evil in the world. The empirical events are neither ways to "reach"
an abstracted state nor are they used self-consciously to "check" the connections
among concepts of the symbolic system. l
Type IV: A priori - Invulnerable - Synthetic
Fully formal theory (e.g., "pure" mathematics) is located at position IV.
Such a knowledge system would have sets of statements of synthetic, invulnerable,
a priori form. The justification of the statements of formal theory like those
of mystical, religious, and metaphysical systems, gain their meaning from the
abstract symbolic structure. This abstract structure does not, however, constitute
an ideal state, a means of ethical interpretation, or an attempt at a state of
absolute knowledge. These sorts of issues simply do not arise in regard to formal
theory. I will return to this point later in regard to scientific systems.
Type V: A posteriori - Vulnerable - Analytic
Magical knowledge systems, as characterized by Judith Willer, are the ideal
typical illustration for this "area" of the cube. The elements of such systems
are related through empirical connections. The statements which specify the
relations place empirical signs into symbolic systems. The signs carry little
meaning in addition to what they indicate empirically. Regardless of whether the
individual signs are called by terms such as cause, indicator, or predictor, they
are strongly tied to empirical conditions for justification of their meaning.
This might illustrate what I mean by saying that the epistemological dimension
refers to the degree to which statements are dependent on experience for justifica-
tion. The way in which empirical categories are linked to each other may be
symbolic (e.g., mathematical, symbolic logic, magical formulas) yet not abstract.
Abstraction involves developing symbolic systems which are not directly dependent
on empirical circumstances for their meaning and justification.
Type VI: A posteriori - Vulnerable - Synthetic
Type VI consists of sets of synthetic, a posteriori, and contingent state-
ments. Purely naturalistic description seems to fit as an ideal type of this
sort of knowledge system. Willems (1969:46-47) in a discussion of naturalistic
research in psychology, suggests that what a researcher does can be characterized
in terms of two dimensions. The two dimensions are 1) the degree to which ante-
cedent conditions are manipulated, and 2) the degree to which units are imposed
upon the phenomena studied. Naturalistic research is characterized by Willems as
being low on both of these dimensions. 1_1e "degree of imposition of units It
dimension utilized by Willems coincides with the contingent-necessary (semantic)
dimension of the present model and his "degree of manipulation of antecedent
conditions" coincides with the a priori - a posteriori (epistemological dimension).
Naturalistic research minimizes the degree to which results are "forced into" or
"interpreted in terms of" an invulnerable conceptual scheme (i.e., one made up of
a set of necessary statements), or in Willems' terms, the degree to which units
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(from whatever sort of conceptual scheme) are imposed on the research. Naturalis-
tic research also minimizes the degree to which the conditions under which the
phenomena are studied are manipulated a priori (i.e., empirical conditions are
accepted as they are found and statements receive their justification from
accuracy of the description.) This coincides with the epistemological dimension.
The third dimension of the model is not explicitly reflected in Willems'
presentation. Willems is, however, writing in the context of a methodology for
the science of psychology and would, presumably, agree that the statements forming
naturalistic knowledge of phenomena would, in their ideal form, be logically open
and synthetic rather than logically closed and analytic.
Type VII: A posteriori - Invulnerable - Analytic
Ideological thought systems can be characterized as analytic, invulnerable,
and a posteriori. Ideology defines empirical events (i.e., it is a posteriori) in
a logically closed manner (i.e., it is analytic), and these events are related to
one another in a iogical1y necessary form (i.e., the set of statements are
invulnerable). Therefore, it illustrates the ideal type for position VII.
Type VIII: A posteriori - Invulnerable - Synthetic
Paradigms, or formal statements of the sum of past knowledge for some subject
area approach the ideal extreme for type VIII. The paradigms which Kuhn (1962)
discusses would be an example of the type of knowledge systems found here. The
statements are of an a posteriori, synthetic, and necessary form. Kuhn points out
that the theories of a science are learned through sets of standard examples and
illustrations which demonstrate the concepts, laws, and applications of those
theories. These latter " ••• intellectual tools are from the start encountered
in a historically and pedagogically prior unit that displays them with and through
their applications" (Kuhn, 1962:46). The prior unit is the set of standard
examples and illustrations. This being the case, the concepts, laws, and
applications are, within paradigms, logically subsequent (a posteriori) to the
problems which they explain.
Since these paradigms are transmitted through and learned from exposure to
classroom, laboratory, and textbook experiences they are, at least in their
ideal form, consistent sets of statements.
Kuhn states that paradigms also, within "normal science," function as guides
to research through both direct modeling and through abstracted rules.
Normal science can proceed without rules only so long as the relevant
scientific community accepts without question the particular problem-
solutions already achieved. Rules should therefore become important
and the characteristic unconcern about them should vanish whenever
paradigms or models are felt to be insecure (Kuhn, 1962:47, my emphasis).
Interpreting Kuhn's statement in terms of the model being presented here, we can
say that the "problem-solutions" constitute paradigms only as.. long as their state-
ments are accepted and used by the relevant scientific community as necessary and
invulnerable.
Scientific systems have not been placed at any of the "extremes" of the graphic
model. They do not then constitute an ideal type in terms of some combination of
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the extremes of the dimensions of the model. This is because scientific thought
systems establish empirical interpretations for systems of formal theory. The
statements of scientific systems gain their justification and meaning from both
the formal theoretic and the empirical level.
Empirical statements are used to check and illustrate the "correctness" of
the connections at the symbolic level. Scientific knowledge systems result from
this form of connecting the abstract and empirical levels. These systems consist
of the reciprocal connections of formal theoretical systems and empirical systems.
Scientific thought is the establishment of such connections through abstraction.
All knowledge systems have methodologies. Concerns with the specification
of procedures and activities .for developing and maintaini~g the form and type of
the specific knowledge system are located here. Concerns with methodology in this
sense overlap with those of sociology of knowledge and epistemology. The implica-
tion is that a thorough understanding of scientific methodology, for example,
cannot be gained without an understanding of the methodologies of other forms of
knowledge. An understanding of such methodologies is not a matter of learning
mechanical steps and procedures but also includes realizing the cognitive use to
which knowledge is put by each type of system. I am attempting to convey the
idea that the "movement" of systems of knowledge ''within the cube" are as much
a matter of the cognitive orientation toward knowledge as it is a matter of
specific procedure. Carlos Castaneda in the books The Teachings of Don Juan and
A Separate Reality reports his encounters with a system of mystical knowledge.
His cognitive orientation toward his experience, as he reports it, shifts between
attempts to make objective scientific sense of what was going on, and full partici-
pation in the mystical system itself. Both of these orientations are "anchored to"
the same experiential world and yet both lead to different sorts of knowledge
about that world - and most interestingly - the systems do not seem to be
necessarily mutually exclusive in the sense that if you "have" one you cannot
"gain" the other. They are, however, mutually exclusive in the sense that
"operating" with one prohibits simultaneously operating with the other.
This paper has suggested a model for the structure of knowledge systems.
There has also been some attempt to illustrate aspects of the model by describing
some familiar types of knowledge systems. However, descriptions of ideal types
is not the only, nor the most fruitful use of the model. The model is intended
as an initial step for the development of a theory of knowledge. Two useful
"next steps" might be to attempt the description of empirically existing knowledge
systems and descriptions of changes that they have undergone over time.
Attempting to explain these changes in terms of societal conditions would be an
aspect of sociology of knowledge; specifying the effects such a change has for
intellectual functioning would be an aspect of cognitive psychology. The inte-
gration of all such approaches into an overall theory would constitute a theory
of knowledge.
Footnotes
lSee Judith and David Willer's discussion on religion in Judith Willer, 1971:
29-30; 56-90.
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